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Abstract
The available evidence from numerous studies in psychology suggests that
overconfidence is a more important phenomenon in North America than in
Japan. Relatedly, North Americans appear to view high self-esteem more posi-
tively than Japanese. The pattern is reversed when it comes to shame, a social
emotion which appears to play a more important role among Japanese than
North Americans. We develop an economic model that endogenizes these ob-
served differences. A crucial tradeoff arises in the model between the benefits of
encouraging self-improvement and the benefits of promoting initiative and new
investments. In this context, self-esteem maintenance (self-enhancement) and
high sensitivity to shame emerge as substitute mechanisms to induce efficient ef-
fort and investment decisions, generating a “North American” equilibrium with
overconfidence and low sensitivity to shame, and a “Japanese” equilibrium with
high sensitivity to shame and no overconfidence. The analysis identifies the key
equilibrium costs as well as the benefits of reliance on each mechanism, and the
implications for welfare.
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“Pride hurts, modesty benefits.”
The Counsels of Great Yu in the Document of Shangshu, 6th century BC
“All you need in this life is ignorance and confidence; then success is sure.”
Mark Twain (1835 - 1910), Letter to Mrs Foote, Dec. 2, 1887
1 Introduction
A large literature in psychology documents people’s need for a positive view of them-
selves. One aspect of this is individuals’ tendency to selectively focus attention,
interpret and remember events so as to maintain or enhance confidence in their abil-
ity, and thereby maintain self-esteem1. Relatedly, recent work in economics shows
that individuals tend to update their beliefs differently in response to good news or
bad news about their ability.2
Interestingly, though, the importance of (over)confidence in one’s ability varies
significantly across cultures. Heine et al. (1999) find striking differences in their
review of the evidence on North America and Japan (discussed in detail in section 2).
In a nutshell, while the distributions of self-esteem scores for North Americans are
heavily skewed towards high self-esteem, this is not the case for the Japanese, whose
self-evaluations are lower and approximately normally distributed. Relatedly, the
false uniqueness bias (the tendency to see oneself as better than most others) has been
found in a number of studies of North Americans, but is absent from similar studies
of Japanese. Moreover, the self-serving biases documented in the North American
attribution literature, showing that individuals tend to attribute their successes to
their intrinsic characteristics (e.g. talent), while attributing their failures to bad luck
or other external factors, do not appear in analogous studies of the Japanese, who
tend to attribute failures as much as successes to their own (in)abilities.
It could be conjectured that these differences do not reflect genuine differences
in beliefs, but only in the appearance of beliefs: the Japanese may wish to appear
more modest, while North Americans may wish to appear more confident, than they
really are. This, it could be argued, might be a rational response to different so-
cial norms, with modest self-presentation gaining greater social approval in Japan,
and more confident self-presentation securing greater social approval in North Amer-
ica. However, there is evidence of greater self-enhancement by North Americans and
greater self-criticism by Japanese even with complete anonymity of responses, and
when individuals are unaware that their behaviors are being observed (see Heine et
1We discuss this literature in section 2.
2Eil and Rao (2011) find that updating following good news adheres quite closely to the Bayesian
benchmark, while updating following bad news produces posterior beliefs nearly uncorrelated with
Bayesian inference. Mo¨bius, Niederle, Niehaus and Rosenblat (2013) find that subjects substantially
over-weight good news relative to bad news.
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al. (1999) for a review). Our paper takes a first step towards understanding these ob-
servations, and their economic implications. In our model, differences in beliefs about
the self arise endogenously, generating a “North American” equilibrium in which over-
confidence is more valuable than in another (“Japanese”) equilibrium. Our theory
suggests an interpretation of the empirical evidence on cultural differences as reflect-
ing differences in actual beliefs and in the functional value of those beliefs. Traits such
as self-confidence or modesty can then be expected to be viewed as more desirable
where their functional value is greater.
Beliefs about the self interact with the social and economic environment. We
focus on one main characteristic of the environment that has attracted considerable
attention in comparisons of Japan and the United States during the postwar pe-
riod3: the degree of stability, or conversely the degree of mobility. What we have
in mind are the following well-documented4 differences between the two countries:
job mobility has been considerably lower in Japan, largely because of institutions
such as “lifetime” employment and late promotions in larger firms, which also offer
more attractive conditions than smaller firms; unemployment rates have been lower
in Japan; takeovers (with all the changes in management and strategy that they often
entail) have been far less frequent in Japan; business start-up rates have been lower in
Japan; investments in companies have tended to be more long-term in Japan (partly
because of greater reliance on relationship banking); divorce rates have been much
lower in Japan... While these observations may have a variety of different causes, the
important point for our purposes is that they tend to go in the same direction: i.e.
from the point of view of a single individual who takes the environment as given, life
in Japan would be expected to entail greater stability (lower mobility) than in the
United States. This was clearly the case up to the 1990s; since then the gap seems to
have narrowed but certainly not disappeared (see, for example, Moriguchi and Ono
(2004), Ono (2010)).
In our model, we capture this characteristic of the environment through the prob-
ability, pi, that an individual will continue an existing “project” (activity, task, re-
lationship) in the long term. If instead the project comes to an end earlier, the
individual has to decide whether to invest in a new project. We can also think of
pi as representing the expected fraction of projects that are continued in the long
run. Obviously there are many situations in which individuals can choose whether
to continue an existing project or invest in a new one; however, a salient difference
between Japan and the United States seems to be the higher probability of contin-
uing projects in the long term in Japan for institutional and other reasons that are
largely exogenous from an individual perspective. Thus, we treat pi as a characteristic
of the environment. Specifically, we begin by assuming that pi is given in a society,
reflecting existing institutions and other exogenous characteristics. We then consider
the implications of endogenizing pi by allowing individuals to vote on the institutions
in their society.
The key idea we explore in the first part of the paper is the following. There is
3While the quotes presented at the beginning of the paper are intriguing, data on measures of
self-esteem and experimental evidence on self-confidence are only available for the postwar period.
We therefore focus attention on this period.
4See, among others, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), Imai and Kawagoe (2000), Moriguchi and
Ono (2004), Ono (2006, 2010).
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a potential tradeoff between the benefits and the costs of overconfidence. In many
circumstances, an individual who is overconfident about his talent/skills will overes-
timate his probability of success if he undertakes a new project (“I am talented, I
will succeed”). He will also underestimate the benefits from exerting effort to identify
ways of improving his performance on an existing, continuing project (“I am doing
fine”). Overconfidence will then increase the likelihood of investing in new projects,
while reducing effort to scrutinize performance on existing projects, pay attention to
criticism and negative feedback, and seek better ways of doing things. Evidence on
this is available for a variety of contexts5. The first,“initiative” effect can be beneficial
when individuals have time-inconsistent preferences, by helping them to undertake
new worthwhile projects that would otherwise be forsaken because of a bias in fa-
vor of immediate gratification. The second,“complacency” effect can inhibit valuable
learning and self-improvement.
We analyze the interplay of these two effects in an intrapersonal game6 between
an individual’s current self and his future self, where the current self can influence the
future self’s recall and interpretation of a (current) “bad” signal about his talent/skill.
This allows us to capture parsimoniously the possibilities for memory management
(e.g. through selective attention) and self-serving interpretations discussed more fully
in section 2. At the same time, for much of the analysis we maintain the standard
assumption in economics that individuals are rational and “Bayesian”: in particular,
the future self will update his beliefs taking into account the possibility that the
current self might have “suppressed” the bad signal. Thus individuals cannot simply
choose their future beliefs as they wish, but they can influence them to some extent.
Importantly, the current self takes into account the probability that the future
5Individuals’ confidence in their ability has been found to be positively related to their intentions
to start new businesses (Chen et al. (1998), De Noble et al. (1999)). Relatedly, patent inventors
who chose to start a new business have been found to possess higher levels of self-confidence than
patent inventors who chose not to start a new business (Markman et al. (2002)). On the other hand,
higher self-confidence has been found to be correlated with persistence in unproductive activities in
spite of negative feedback (Whyte and Saks (2007)). Vancouver and Kendall (2006) measured self-
confidence and subsequent exam performance for the same individuals taking five different exams.
They found a negative relationship at the within-person level of analysis. Leung (2002) examined
data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), showing that Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea and Singapore students outperformed their counterparts in other countries in
mathematics achievement. He found that the most striking common factor in these four countries,
different from the rest, was the relative low confidence in doing mathematics of the students. Wood
and Lynch (2002) looked at the role of prior knowledge in learning about new products in situations
where new information makes existing product knowledge obsolete. They found that, compared to
consumers with lower prior knowledge, those with higher prior knowledge learn less about a new
product, and this is due to inattention at encoding (rather than reconstructive errors at retrieval).
Berner and Graber (2008) review the evidence on the link between physician overconfidence and
errors in medical diagnosis. While a causal link in this context is particularly difficult to establish,
there is some suggestive evidence. For example, in a study of radiologists given sets of “unknown”
films to classify as normal or abnormal, the confidence level of the worst performers was higher
than that of the top performers. Finally, although the economics literature has not focused on
the implications of overconfidence for self-improvement, existing evidence concerning the impact
of overconfidence on corporate investment decisions and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate (2005,
2008)) seems consistent with the “complacency” effect.
6The model, with only minor modifications, also admits an interesting alternative interpretation
as an interpersonal game between parent and child. We discuss this in section 1.1.
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self will have to decide whether to invest in a new project, versus the probability
that he will have to choose how much self-improvement effort to exert on an existing,
continuing project. Our first main result is that overconfidence emerges in equilibrium
when, and only when, the relative importance of undertaking new projects versus
investing in improving one’s performance on existing projects is sufficiently high. An
immediate implication of this result is that we are less likely to observe overconfidence
in “stable” societies, where the probability of continuing old projects is high, and
more likely to observe overconfidence in “dynamic” societies, where this probability
is lower. This may help to explain the differences in self-esteem and self-enhancement
documented for Japan and North America.
Our model also suggests that perfectionism (meant here as a disposition to be self-
critical and to persistently seek improvement) will be considered more valuable in the
first type of society, while dynamism (showing initiative, being enterprising) will be
considered more valuable in the second. Interestingly, a key business concept that
has been very successful in Japan is the idea of kaizen (“continuous improvement”),
which emphasizes the importance of gradual improvement at the corporate level.7
In order to investigate robustness and obtain additional empirical predictions, we
extend our model in two ways in section 4. First, we consider a version of the model
with a richer signal structure: an individual may receive not only a bad signal or no
signal as before, he may also receive a good signal. Our previous result, that overcon-
fidence emerges in equilibrium when the probability of facing new project investment
decisions is sufficiently high, continues to hold in this version of the model. Similarly
we find again the equilibrium with accurate beliefs for lower values of this probability.
For lower values still, there is a new equilibrium, in which individuals suppress the
good signal, thereby reducing their ex-post confidence. The first equilibrium, in which
individuals suppress the bad signal, yields a distribution of beliefs that is skewed to-
wards higher self-confidence (relative to accurate beliefs), since those who receive the
bad signal “pool” with those who receive no signal. This pattern resembles the one
documented for North America. The second equilibrium, where individuals do not
suppress either signal, exhibits no such skewness, and is similar to the pattern ob-
served for Japan. Finally the third equilibrium yields a distribution skewed towards
lower self-confidence, different from North America and also from Japan.
We then extend the model in another direction, by considering the role of “naive”
agents. These may be individuals who suppress bad signals without being aware of it.
Alternatively, they may be individuals who are aware of their biases in processing and
recalling information, but lack the cognitive skills required for full Bayesian updating
of beliefs ex post. Unaware agents do not act strategically; cognitively-constrained
agents do, taking into account their cognitive constraints. We show that in very
“dynamic” societies, all naive as well as sophisticated agents suppress the bad signal
in equilibrium. Ex post, naive agents have higher self-confidence than sophisticated
agents. On the other hand, in very “stable” societies only unaware agents suppress
the bad signal; ex post, sophisticated and cognitively-constrained agents have the
7For a short description and commentary, see The Economist, 14 October 2009. Just as interesting
is their explanation for why kaizen has “lost some of its shine” more recently: “Influential in the
decline of the idea was the new-found emphasis on the speed of change and on the need for firms
to “morph” in double-quick time to seize the opportunities presented by e-commerce and other
developments in information technology”.
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same beliefs. Thus if the population consists of a mixture of sophisticated and naive
agents, average self-confidence will be higher in the more “dynamic” societies. This
is consistent with the evidence reviewed in section 2.
So far, our results have been obtained assuming that pi, the degree of stabil-
ity/dynamism, is given for a particular society. We then ask the question: what
happens if citizens can vote over institutions and thereby choose pi? In the last part
of section 4, we show that for some parameter values this leads to the interesting pos-
sibility of multiple equilibria with endogenous pi. In particular, we may observe two
ex-ante identical societies in quite different equilibria: in one, individuals suppress
bad signals and choose a low value of pi, while in the other, individuals do not suppress
bad signals, and they choose a high value of pi. Thus overconfidence and dynamism
reinforce each other in one equilibrium, realistic self-assessment and stability in the
other.
Our analysis in section 4 focuses entirely on self-confidence as a motivational
mechanism. However, shame, and the desire to avoid it, can also be a powerful moti-
vational mechanism. Recent research in social anthropology shows that the capacity
to feel shame is pervasive across cultures, but cultures differ significantly in their
reliance on the emotion of shame as a motivational mechanism (see Fessler (2007)).
This is particularly interesting for our purposes in light of the evidence, discussed in
section 2, that shame plays a more important role in Japan than in North America,
and that Japanese parenting practices tend to foster sensitivity to shame more than
American ones. How do these motivational mechanisms interact?
We explore this question in section 5, where we modify the model by introducing a
cost of shame, S, associated with social disapproval. Since decisions to undertake new
projects (or not) are, at least imperfectly, observable by others (e.g. starting a new
business, taking up new activities, finding a new job, learning new skills, moving to a
different location, starting new relationships), they can be subject to social approval
(disapproval). In contrast, self-improvement effort is not observable by others. We
therefore assume that an individual will experience the cost S if he is faced with
the choice to undertake a new project or not, and chooses not to go ahead8. We
investigate two questions. First, for a given cost of shame S, i.e. taking existing
social and cultural norms as given, what is the set of equilibria of the intra-personal
game we studied in section 4 without allowing for shame? Second, what would be
the socially optimal value of S?
Intuitively, shame can provide incentives to undertake new projects, obviating the
need for overconfidence, and thereby improving incentives to invest in self-improvement.
However, in the presence of unobservable individual heterogeneity, an equilibrium
with shame might imply that some individuals efficiently refrain from undertaking
new projects, and are inefficiently penalized for this, or that some individuals inef-
ficiently undertake new projects. In fact, as we show, it is not efficient to have an
intermediate cost of shame S, such that some individuals refrain from investment and
8We have also investigated a version of the model where the cost of shame is incurred when
the original, continuing project fails. However, shame from failure is not efficient in our setting,
essentially because failure occurs with some probability even when high effort is provided, so that
reliance on this as a motivational mechanism would be too costly. On the other hand, failure
will obviously lead to unfavorable updating of beliefs about the individual’s ability, which can be
interpreted as “stigma” from failure.
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incur the cost of shame in equilibrium. The only efficient equilibria involving shame
emerge for values of S which induce all individuals to invest rather than incur the
cost of shame. Efficient equilibria with shame, therefore, entail a form of conformism.
We find that reliance on shame can be efficient in dynamic societies as well as
in stable societies, depending on parameter values. For very “stable” societies, the
efficient equilibrium never entails overconfidence, but may entail an important role
for shame. For very “dynamic” societies, on the other hand, the efficient equilibrium
will entail either overconfidence and no role for shame, or no overconfidence and
an important role for shame. Thus shame and overconfidence emerge as substitute
mechanisms in dynamic societies, while overconfidence plays no role in very stable
societies. This is consistent with the evidence discussed below.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section relates our work to
the existing literature in economics. Section 2 reviews the evidence from psychology,
anthropology and economics that motivates our model. Section 3 introduces the
baseline model. The costs and benefits of overconfidence are examined in section 4,
and a number of extensions of the basic analysis are discussed. Section 5 introduces
shame. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Relationship to the literature
A growing literature is demonstrating the importance of noncognitive skills and traits
for a variety of life outcomes9. Several theoretical contributions have focused in
particular on the role of self-confidence: Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) have shown
that overconfidence can help to alleviate an under-investment problem arising when
preferences are time-inconsistent10, while Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) also consider
the psychological benefits of overconfidence in the presence of anticipatory utility,
and their implications for identity investments.11 We share with these papers the
assumption that self-confidence can be influenced by biases in information processing
and recall. Our focus, however, is on why such biases may be more common in some
environments than others, and hence on cultural differences in self-confidence.
In this respect, our work is also related to Alesina and Angeletos (2005), and
Be´nabou and Tirole (2006). These papers study the interaction between beliefs about
the relative importance of effort and luck in determining incomes, and choices of
redistributive policies. This leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria, with some
societies exhibiting low levels of redistribution and beliefs in the importance of effort,
while others exhibit high levels of redistribution and beliefs in the importance of
luck. In a similar vein, we show in section 4 how multiple equilibria can arise in our
9See Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman and Kautz (2011) for a review and discussion.
10For a different approach to the problem of time-inconsistent preferences, see Becker and Mulligan
(1997), where individuals devote time and effort to make future pleasures less remote in their mind.
11Related papers include Be´nabou (2013), which studies denial of bad news in groups when indi-
viduals have anticipatory preferences, Compte and Postlewaite (2004), who show that when confi-
dence has a positive effect on performance, biases in information processing can enhance individual
welfare, Dess´ı (2008), where a demand for cultural over-confidence emerges as a solution to the
under-investment problem due to the presence of social externalities in cultural investment deci-
sions, and Ko¨szegi (2006), where individuals derive “ego utility” from positive views about their
ability. Imperfect self-knowledge is also a key ingredient in the theory of endogenous peer effects
developed by Battaglini et al. (2005)
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model, with some societies exhibiting greater dynamism and overconfident beliefs,
while others exhibit greater stability and no overconfidence.
A simple way to try to explain observed country differences in self-confidence
might be to suppose that they are due to country differences in time preference. In
our model, overconfidence only emerges in the presence of a bias towards immediate
gratification. The observed difference between the U.S. and Japan could then be due
to the Japanese being significantly more patient than North Americans. However,
we are only aware of one systematic study of country differences in time discounting:
Wang, Rieger and Hens (2009) present evidence on β for a sample of 45 countries.
Their mean (median) for the U.S. is 0.69 (0.78), higher than the corresponding figures
for Japan, 0.64 (0.70), implying if anything that the Japanese have a slightly greater
present bias. We therefore abstract from differences in time preferences in our model:
our results are driven entirely by the trade-off between the costs and benefits of
overconfidence, leading to different equilibria in “stable” and “dynamic” societies.
The possibility that observed differences in self-confidence might be due to genetic
differences between Japanese and North Americans is sometimes suggested to us,
but we are not aware of any evidence supporting this hypothesis. There is, on the
other hand, evidence from longitudinal studies of Japanese individuals who moved
to Canada and Canadian individuals who moved to Japan, showing a significant
tendency for the Canadians’ self-confidence to decrease after moving to Japan, while
the Japanese’ self-confidence increases after moving to Canada (Heine and Lehman
(2004), see section 2 below). This suggests that genetic differences, if any, could only
be part of the explanation for observed differences in self-confidence.
Another hypothesis that is sometimes put forward concerns the effects of selection
in migration patterns, combined with intergenerational transmission of traits. Histor-
ically, the argument goes, migrations to North America are likely to have attracted
individuals with higher than average self-confidence, who then encouraged and nur-
tured self-confidence in their children. While the importance of this form of selection
would be very difficult to establish empirically12, the evidence reviewed in section 2.2
does suggest an important role for differences in parenting practices between North
America and East Asia. The model we present in section 4, with minor modifications,
admits an alternative interpretation in terms of intergenerational transmission, where
the “future self” is the child, and the “current self” the parent, who internalizes the
child’s welfare. Although we do not focus on this interpretation in section 4, to do
justice to the evidence on memory and updating biases, we do give it more weight
in section 5, where we study the role of shame. Our paper is therefore related to
the existing literature on cultural transmission. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) study
more generally the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. We focus instead
on specific traits (self-confidence, sensitivity to shame), and examine their role as
motivational mechanisms.
The functional role of emotions has attracted economists’ attention in recent work,
notably in research on envy and regret by Coricelli and Rustichini (2010) and Rus-
tichini (2008). We focus on the emotion of shame and explore the circumstances in
12Recent work by Abramitzky, Platt Boustan and Eriksson (2012) has established the importance
of selection effects in migrations to America for observable variables, such as occupation and wealth.
No corresponding data is available for self-esteem.
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which shame emerges as an equilibrium mechanism to induce efficient investment de-
cisions. At the same time, we identify a social cost of reliance on this mechanism, due
to the impossibility of tailoring the personal cost of shame to “fit” other, privately
known individual characteristics. Thus shame can induce “too much” conformity.
Our approach here builds on the evidence from studies in social anthropology. Re-
viewing these, Fessler (2007) notes that “shame is prototypically elicited by situations
in which i) the actor has failed to live up to some cultural standard for behavior, ii)
others are aware of this failure, and iii) the actor is aware of others’ knowledge in this
regard”. It is not clear, in general, to what extent others’ disapproval and hostility
following the violation of a cultural standard for behavior are a direct reaction to
the observed behavior, and to what extent they are derived from preferences over
particular individual traits that are inferred from the behavior13. Thus our modeling
strategy, in which shame attaches to actions, seems reasonable in our setting; we
view it as complementary to models of conformity where damage to status attaches
to inferred predispositions, as in Bernheim (1994).
2 Confidence and shame: evidence for North Amer-
ica and Japan
This section reviews the evidence in psychology, anthropology and economics that
motivates our model.
2.1 Overconfidence?
A large literature in psychology has explored people’s need for a positive self-view,
and, relatedly, the extent to which individuals hold overconfident beliefs about their
ability. In this context, overconfidence can be defined in absolute or relative terms:
individuals may believe that their ability is greater than it really is, or they may
believe that their position in the overall distribution of ability in the relevant popu-
lation is higher than it really is. We now review the main findings, highlighting the
observed differences between North America and Japan.
2.1.1 Self-esteem scores
One very popular approach is to estimate self-esteem scores by asking individuals to
report to what extent they agree or disagree14 with a number of statements intended
to capture self-esteem. The ten-item Rosenberg (1965) scale is the most widely used
for this purpose, and has been applied in a very large number of studies. Items include
“I am able to do things as well as most other people”; “All in all, I am inclined to
feel that I am a failure”; and “I take a positive attitude toward myself”. The first of
13The experimental evidence on how people respond to “unfair” behavior suggests that their
reactions are driven by both, outcomes and inferences about traits/intentions (see, for example, Falk,
Fehr and Fischbacher (2003); Fehr and Schmidt (2005) provide an excellent review and discussion).
14Possible answers are “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “agree” and “strongly agree”, with corre-
sponding scores typically from one to four for positive items, and the order reversed for negative
items.
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these captures specifically beliefs about ability, and clearly does so in relative terms.
The other two statements may also capture other influences on self-esteem, and could
reflect an absolute comparison (to some standard) or a relative one.
Self-esteem scores appear to differ substantially in North America and Japan,
across numerous studies. The distribution of self-esteem scores for North American
subjects is typically very skewed towards high self-esteem (see Baumeister et al. (1989)
and Heine et al. (1999) for reviews and discussions); this is not the case for Japanese
subjects (Bond and Cheung (1983), Campbell et al. (1996), Heine et al. (1999),
Mahler (1976), Schmitt and Allik (2005)). Moreover, North Americans tend to have
significantly higher scores than Japanese for all items but one15 on the Rosenberg
scale, including in particular the item that captures beliefs about (relative) ability
(Heine et al. (1999)). Thus while differences in self-esteem may also capture other
aspects, they clearly reflect important differences in confidence about ability. Indeed,
Schmitt and Allik (2005) decompose global self-esteem scores into subcomponents of
self-competence (feeling confident, capable and efficacious) and self-liking: the mean
score for self-competence is significantly higher for subjects in the United States than
in Japan.
An important question then is whether these findings reflect cultural differences.
Evidence in favor of this interpretation is provided by Heine and Lehman (2004). They
obtained self-esteem scores at different points in time for two samples of Japanese
students visiting Canada. For one sample they found a significant increase in self-
esteem with exposure to Canadian culture, while for the other sample the increase was
not significant. Heine and Lehman similarly obtained self-esteem scores for a sample
of Canadian English teachers who went to live in Japan. They found a significant
decrease in self-esteem with exposure to Japanese culture.
2.1.2 Other measures of self-confidence and self-enhancement
The findings from studies using self-esteem scores have been confirmed by a large
empirical literature in psychology using a variety of related albeit different methods.
These include:
(i) studies in which participants evaluate themselves and the average person on
the same scale. These studies have found a much greater degree of self-enhancement
(the well-known “better-than-average” effect) among North American and Israeli par-
ticipants than among East Asian (mainly Japanese and Singaporean) participants16.
(ii) studies in which participants estimate the percentage of people who are more
talented than themselves on a variety of dimensions. Here too North American sub-
jects self-enhance much more than Japanese subjects17, exhibiting the so-called “false
uniqueness” effect (a good example of this is given by Svenson (1981): in his US sam-
ple, 93% of participants believed themselves to be more skillful than the median in
15The exception is the item “I certainly feel useless at times”, for which there is no significant
difference.
16Brown and Kobayashi (2002), Crystal (1999), Endo, Heine and Lehman (2000), Heine and
Lehman (1999), Kobayashi and Brown (2003), Kurman (2001, 2003), Kurman and Sriram (2002),
Sedikides, Gaertner and Toguchi (2003).
17Heine, Kitayama and Lehman (2001), Heine and Lehman (1997), Markus and Kitayama (1991),
Norasakkunkit and Kalick (2002).
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the group).
(iii) studies in which participants indicate how much their successes and failures
are due to their own abilities. American students are much more likely than Chinese
or Japanese students to attribute their successes to their ability and their failures to
external factors18.
(iv) studies eliciting participants’ memories of their successes and failures. Endo
and Meijer (2004) found evidence of self-enhancement among American subjects, but
the opposite among Japanese subjects.
All these and other studies have been reviewed in a meta-analysis by Heine and
Hamamura (2007): they conclude that North Americans show a clear self-serving bias
while East Asians do not.
2.1.3 True or apparent overconfidence?
Benoˆıt and Dubra (2011) have argued that studies where overconfidence is measured
by asking individuals to rate themselves relative to the median cannot be used to
demonstrate true overconfidence. In particular, the finding that a majority of people
rate themselves above the median is consistent with Bayesian updating by individu-
als with imperfect knowledge of their ability, starting with a common prior. Burks,
Carpenter, Goette and Rustichini (2013) have studied the implications of Bayesian
updating from a common prior in this context and identified restrictions imposed on
the joint distribution of beliefs and true ability. They then tested the restrictions ex-
perimentally and rejected them. This, combined with all the other evidence discussed
in this section, suggests that overconfidence is an important phenomenon. Yet its im-
portance is significantly greater in North America than in Japan: this observation is
the main focus of our paper.
2.1.4 Incentivized beliefs about ability
To economists, beliefs elicited in experiments where subjects are given no monetary
incentives to tell the truth may not seem sufficiently reliable. This still would not
explain the systematic difference between North American and Japanese responses
across a variety of samples. More importantly though, the presence of a substantial
bias towards overconfidence among North Americans has been confirmed by Burks et
al. (2013), who do address the potential concern over the reliability of answers in the
absence of monetary incentives19. They administer two tests of cognitive ability to
1016 US subjects, eliciting their beliefs about their ability before and after the test.
Each time, subjects are asked to specify which quintile of the group’s performance they
believe they will be (were) in. Monetary incentives are provided to motivate subjects
to give correct answers. The results show that well over 60% of subjects believe
they are in the top two quintiles; moreover, overconfident judgements are pervasive
wherever possible, i.e. across the first four quintiles of the distribution. Relatedly,
Eil and Rao (2011) and Mo¨bius et al. (2013) find, again eliciting incentivized beliefs,
that North American subjects revise their beliefs differently in response to good news
and bad news (see footnote 2).
18Anderson (1999), Endo and Meijer (2004).
19See also Hoezl and Rustichini (2005).
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2.1.5 Self-esteem maintenance strategies
How are overconfident beliefs sustained? In psychology, a large North American
literature has documented the existence of self-serving biases, whereby individuals
essentially suppress “bad” signals about their ability and other attributes. This is
achieved in a number of ways, including the following:
(a) selective recall of information (e.g. Sanitioso, Kunda and Fong (1990));
(b) subjecting “negative” information to greater scrutiny to find flaws in it or rea-
sons to dismiss its significance (see Baumeister and Newman (1994), Kunda (1990)),
and possibly develop alternative explanations that effectively suppress the bad signal
(Ditto and Lopez (1992), Ditto et al. (1998));
(c) dismissing the importance of skills one does not have and emphasizing the
value of traits one does possess (Dunning and Cohen (1992), Dunning et al. (1989),
Tesser and Paulhus (1983));
(d) perceiving own shortcomings as common, own strengths and abilities as un-
common (Muellen and Goethals (1990)).
Yet where attempts have been made to find similar evidence of self-serving biases
among Japanese subjects, they have generally failed to do so. For example, as noted
earlier, North American subjects tend to attribute their successes to their ability and
their failures to external factors such as bad luck (see Zuckerman (1979) for a review).
However, studies of Japanese subjects tend to find instead that they attribute failures
as much as successes to own (in)abilities (Kitayama et al. (1995), Brown, Gray and
Ferrara (2005)).
Relatedly, Baumeister and Jones (1978) found that American participants com-
pensated for negative self-relevant feedback in one domain by inflating their self-
assessments in another domain. Heine, Kitayama and Lehman (2001) have investi-
gated whether Canadian and Japanese participants exhibit a similar tendency. All
participants were given success or failure feedback following a creativity test; they
were then asked to evaluate themselves on dimensions unrelated to creativity. Cana-
dian participants did not show any significant difference in self-evaluations on unre-
lated dimensions following success or failure feedback on the creativity task. Japanese
participants provided less favorable self-evaluations on the other dimensions following
failure on the creativity test.
Further evidence suggesting that self-esteem maintenance strategies play a more
important role for North Americans than for Japanese is provided by studies of self-
affirmation and dissonance. In these studies, participants typically choose between
two desirable alternatives; they also evaluate the two alternatives before and after
making their choice. North American participants usually evaluate their chosen al-
ternative more positively, and the rejected alternative less positively, after making
their choice (e.g. Steele, Spencer and Lynch (1993), Heine and Lehman (1997)). This
behavior is consistent with a desire to maintain self-esteem by rationalizing one’s
choices ex post as “the right ones”. Japanese participants, in contrast, do not sys-
tematically change their evaluations after making their choice (Heine and Lehman
(1997)).
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2.2 Shame
North Americans and Japanese appear to differ also in terms of the importance they
attach to shame. In an influential early work on this topic, Benedict (1946) charac-
terized Japan as a shame culture. She was subsequently criticized by a number of
researchers for defining this in terms of reliance on external sanctions (others’ disap-
proval, losing face etc.) for good behavior - a notion sometimes referred to as “public
shame”. Some authors have emphasized instead the importance of “private shame”,
whereby others’ critical gaze on the self is internalized. Nevertheless, as Heine et al.
(1999) pointed out, “most are in agreement that shame occupies a privileged position
for Japanese” - a claim that still applies to date (see for example Creighton (1990);
Crystal et al. (2001); Doi (1973); Fessler (2007); Johnson (1993); Kuwayama (1992);
Lebra (1983)).
In contrast, research by social anthropologists has found that Californians have a
“relatively impoverished cognitive/lexical ‘landscape of shame’” (Fessler (2007)), and
that for Californians shame as an emotion “is overshadowed by guilt” (which, unlike
shame, “is prototypically associated with issues of harm to others”).
Recent research has investigated the mechanisms that generate cultural differences
in the importance of shame. For example, Miller, Fung and Mintz (1996) studied
parental practices in American families in Chicago and Chinese families in Taipei.
They found that American parents put considerably more emphasis on protecting
their children’s self-esteem than Chinese parents. In contrast, Chinese parents put
more emphasis on inducing shame and self-criticism following behavioral transgres-
sions. Studies focusing on the comparison of Japanese and American mothers have
found that the former are more likely to use moral reasoning, to encourage children to
think about how others might perceive their behavior, and to induce empathy, guilt,
anxiety and shame in response to discipline problems20.
To summarize, the evidence reviewed in this section points to a more impor-
tant role for shame in Japan than in North America, and a more important role
for (over)confidence and self-esteem in North America than in Japan. We explore
possible reasons for this in the remainder of the paper.
3 Baseline model
Our baseline model modifies the one introduced by Be´nabou and Tirole (2002). It has
two periods and three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. At the beginning of the first period (t = 0),
each individual starts a project (activity, task, relationship). At this stage, individuals
are indistinguishable. For simplicity, there is no cost of starting the project. Once
they have started, individuals (privately) receive a signal informative about their
ability/skill, θ. They choose their interpretation and recall strategy. At t = 1 the
individual can continue the same project with probability pi. In this case, he can, at
a cost, invest in self-improvement, thereby increasing the expected returns from the
project. With probability 1 − pi, on the other hand, the individual cannot continue
20See Hess, Kashiwagi, Azuma, Price and Dickson (1980); Kabayashi-Winata and Power (1989);
Lewis (1996); Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake and Weisz (2000); Weisz, Rothbaum and Balackburn
(1984); Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, Cole, Mizuta and Hiruma (1996).
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the existing project. In this case he has to decide whether to undertake a new project.
All project outcomes are realized at t = 2. The timing is depicted in Figure 1.
-st = 0
Start a
project
st = 1
Receive
a signal
Recall
strategy
If the project can be continued, make
the self-improvement effort or not.
Otherwise, start a new project or not.
st = 2
Outcomes
are
realized
Figure 1: Timing
Interpretations of the model
The model, described below, is deliberately stylized, to capture as simply as pos-
sible the general tradeoff between the costs and benefits of overconfidence discussed
in the Introduction. Several interpretations are possible, each one yielding differ-
ent insights. According to one interpretation, which will be the main focus of our
analysis, individuals receive information about different aspects of their ability/skill
from a variety of sources: academic achievements, social interactions, non-academic
activities, work, etc. There is plenty of scope for “creative interpretation” of some
of the information, and for selective attention to different pieces of information, in
ways that generate biased recollections and assessments, as discussed in section 2.
In this interpretation, it is today’s self (self-0) that influences the information that
tomorrow’s self (self-1) will recall: the game is intra-personal.
An alternative interpretation, requiring only minor modifications of the model,
would be in terms of parental, or more generally inter-generational, transmission of
information. Then self-0 would be the older generation (e.g. parents), and self-1
the younger generation: the game is inter-personal. In view of the evidence from
the psychology literature discussed in section 2, we choose to focus on the intra-
personal game of endogeneous interpretation and recall of information as the main
mechanism underlying personal (over)confidence. It should be clear, however, that
both mechanisms are at work in determining confidence, and the main insights from
our analysis apply to both.
In our model, the early end of the existing project (at t = 1) is intended to
capture a variety of situations in which individuals cannot continue with the “status
quo”, and need to decide whether to undertake new activities, initiatives, etc. For
example, when a firm is taken over, the change of ownership may bring with it a
number of changes in the way the firm is run, so that individual employees have to
decide whether to invest in new opportunities within the firm, or possibly search for
an alternative employer. Employees who are laid off often have to decide whether to
invest in acquiring new skills, or incur the costs of moving. Start-up entrepreneurs
whose business fails have to decide whether to seek a “safe” job as employees or invest
in trying to start a new business.
These examples mainly concern decisions to do with work in one form or another,
but the set of circumstances that may require investment in new activities and initia-
tives is much broader. A change of government, for instance, may entail significant
changes in a variety of policies, making it impossible for many people to hold on to the
previous “status quo”: each person who is affected by the changes then has to decide
how much effort and resources to invest in response to the new circumstances. At a
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more personal level, changes in family circumstances, such as divorce, also confront
individuals with choices about new investments (relationships, home, work, etc.).
In section 4, we shall distinguish between more “stable” societies, in which the
probability of being able to hold on to the status quo is higher, and more “dynamic”
societies, in which the probability of having to make decisions about investment in
new activities is higher. To begin with, these differences will be captured by the
exogenous parameter pi, reflecting both exogenous factors and institutions. Our ap-
proach here will be essentially positive, addressing the following question: for a given
set of external factors and society-wide institutions (indexed by pi), what patterns
of confidence will emerge when individual members of the society attempt to behave
(and teach their children to behave) in ways that maximize their expected utility,
subject to the constraints implied by those external factors and institutions? In the
last part of the section, we will also take a more normative approach and consider
welfare consequences. Finally, we will allow for pi to be determined endogenously
through voting, which enables citizens to choose institutions.
3.1 Projects
The initial project brings a benefit W if it succeeds and zero otherwise. The proba-
bility of success depends on the individual’s ability; for simplicity, it is equal to θ. We
assume that θ ∈ [0, θmax], where 0 < θmax < 1. Thus even the most talented/skilled
individual cannot be sure of success. If the project is continued at t = 1, the individ-
ual decides whether to exert self-improvement effort: by incurring the cost k, he can
increase the probability of success by φ(θmax− θ), where 1 > φ > 0. This assumption
captures the idea that by focusing on his failings and weak points, paying attention
to criticism and other negative feedback, searching for new information and exploring
alternative approaches and ideas, the individual can identify and seek out opportuni-
ties for improvement, and thereby achieve a better performance. The scope for such
improvement will be greater for individuals with lower initial skill. This specification
enables us to model as simply as possible the“complacency” effect of overconfidence
discussed in the Introduction21.
If the existing project cannot be continued at t = 1, the individual is faced with
a different choice. He can incur a cost c to undertake a new project, which will yield
benefit V if successful and zero otherwise. The probability of success in this case is
θ. Alternatively, he can undertake another activity whose outcome is less sensitive
to ability. For simplicity, we assume that the return from this alternative activity is
fixed, and normalize it to zero.
3.2 Preferences
We allow for time-inconsistent preferences by assuming that individuals at t = 1
discount expected payoffs at t = 2 with a discount factor equal to βδ, where δ is
21For a colourful account of how overconfidence can inhibit valuable learning and improvement,
see also Kroll et al. (2000). Their examples range from strategic decisions at General Motors to
Napoleon!
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the normal discount rate, while β < 1 corresponds to hyperbolic discounting. In this
case, people give an “excessive” weight to the present.22
3.3 Information and beliefs
Self-0 receives a signal s concerning his ability θ. In the baseline model, for simplicity,
we focus on the case where s can take just two values: s = B (“bad” signal) and
s = ∅ (no signal). Prior beliefs concerning the signal are described by the probability
q; that is, s = ∅ with probability q and s = B with probability 1− q. We can think
of q as the proportion of higher-ability individuals in the population. The expected
value of θ conditional on each possible realization of the true signal s is given by:
θL = E[θ|s = B] < θH = E[θ|s = ∅].
Let sˆ be the signal transmitted by self-0 to self-1. We can think of this as (en-
dogeneous) memory. Given our assumptions, if the true signal is s = ∅, there is no
opportunity for signal manipulation; thus sˆ = ∅. On the other hand, if the true signal
is s = B, self-0 may either communicate the signal truthfully to self-1 (sˆ = B), or
he may decide to suppress the bad signal (sˆ = ∅), as discussed in section 2. At date
1, the state is realized: with probability pi the project is continued, otherwise the
first project ends and self-1 has to decide whether to undertake a second project. At
this date, and before making his investment or effort decision, self-1 privately learns
respectively his cost c or k. At date 0, the cost c is known to be uniformly distributed
over the interval [cL, cH ]. Similarly the cost k is known to be uniformly distributed
over the interval [kL, kH ].
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that:
δφ(θmax − θH)W > kL
self-improvement is always efficient if the cost is sufficiently low; and
δφ(θmax − θL)W < kH
self-improvement is always inefficient if the cost is sufficiently high. Similarly, we
assume that:
δθLV − cL > 0
investment in the new project is always efficient if the cost is sufficiently low, and
δθHV − cH < 0
investment in the new project is always inefficient if the cost is sufficiently high.
Self-0 has just one decision to make, the recall strategy; that is, the probability
that the bad signal will be recalled by self-1:
h = Pr[sˆ = B|s = B].
We shall denote by h∗ the beliefs held by self-1 concerning self-0’s strategy.
The recall strategy is depicted in Figure 2.
22See Strotz (1955) and Laibson (1997).
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Figure 2: Recall strategy
4 The costs and benefits of overconfidence
4.1 Self-1 belief updating and behavior: sophisticated indi-
viduals
Consider self-1’s decisions at date 1, in the light of the information available to him.
Self-1 has to form expectations over his ability θ. In doing so, he will take into
account the possibility that self-0 may have suppressed the true signal s. When
sˆ = B, clearly there has been no suppression; self-1 will therefore have revised beliefs
θL. When sˆ = ∅, self-1 estimates the following probability that the signal is accurate
(the signal’s “reliability”):
r∗ = Pr[s = ∅|sˆ = ∅;h∗] = q
q + (1− q)(1− h∗)
implying that his revised belief is given by:
θ(r∗) = r∗θH + (1− r∗)θL.
Denoting his revised belief by θ∗, clearly self-1 will exert self-improvement effort if,
and only if,
βδφ(θmax − θ∗)W > k.
If the first project has ended, self-1 will undertake the new project if, and only if,
βδθ∗V − c > 0.
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4.2 Self-0 strategy
When s = B, self-0 has to choose the recall strategy, h. If he transmits the signal
accurately to self-1 (sˆ = B), his expected utility (ignoring discounting between date
0 and date 1 for simplicity) is given by:
UT (θL) = pi
[
δθLW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}gdk
]
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθLV
cL
{δθLV − c}fdc
where the subscript T stands for “truth”. If on the other hand self-0 suppresses the
bad signal (sˆ = ∅), his expected utility depends on self-1’s beliefs about the reliability
of the signal, r∗, and is given by:
US(θL, θ(r
∗)) = pi
[
δθLW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}gdk
]
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθ∗V
cL
{δθLV − c}fdc
where the subscript S stands for “suppression”. The net gain from suppressing the
bad signal is therefore equal to:
US(θL, θ(r
∗))− UT (θL) = −pi
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}gdk
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθ∗V
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}fdc. (1)
The first term represents the loss due to overconfidence, which discourages self-
improvement effort. The second term represents the impact of overconfidence on
the decision to invest in the new project. This yields a gain to the extent that it
corrects the under-investment problem due to hyperbolic discounting; if this prob-
lem is small, though, there may be excessive confidence and over-investment. For
expositional simplicity, we shall focus on the more interesting case where β < θL/θH ,
which rules out the possibility of over-investment irrespective of the beliefs held by
self-1. We then have a clear tradeoff between the benefits of overconfidence, which
alleviates the under-investment problem for new project decisions, and the costs of
overconfidence, which exacerbates the problem of under-provision of self-improvement
effort.
4.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE)
We now characterize the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria.23
23While case (i) in Proposition 1 is similar to the case of “defensive pessimism” and case (ii)
resembles the leading case in Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), even though we vary pi rather than β in
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Proposition 1 There exist two threshold values, piH and piL (with piH > piL), such
that: (i) if pi > piH , there is a unique PBE with h
∗ = 1; (ii) if pi < piL, there is a
unique PBE with h∗ = 0; (iii) otherwise, there are three PBEs: the two pure-strategy
equilibria with h∗ = 1 and h∗ = 0 , and a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Intuitively, when the probability of continuation of the existing project is suffi-
ciently large, the expected loss from suppressing the bad signal, which discourages
self-improvement effort, will be more important than the expected gain, arising from
the positive impact of overconfidence on new project investment decisions. Thus the
optimal strategy for self-0 will be to transmit the signal truthfully. On the other
hand, when the probability of having to choose whether to undertake the new project
is high enough, the expected gain from suppression of the bad signal, which alleviates
the under-investment problem, will be greater than the expected loss, so that the op-
timal strategy for self-0 will be to suppress the bad signal. For intermediate values of
pi, the trade-off is such that there are multiple equilibria: a pure-strategy equilibrium
with truthful transmission, a pure-strategy equilibrium with suppression of the bad
signal, and a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider some value of pi within the
intermediate range (piH > pi > piL). When self-1 is very sceptical about the reliability
of self-0’s signal (h∗ = 0), θ∗ will be relatively low. Note that the benefit of suppressing
the bad signal is due to the fact that for some realizations of the cost c which are
lower than the expected benefit from investing in the new project, overconfidence will
lead to (efficient) investment, whereas in the absence of overconfidence there would
be no investment because of hyperbolic discounting. For low θ∗ the marginal benefit
will be high, since the cost realizations for which this switch to efficient investment
will occur will be those for which the net expected benefit from investment is high.
As θ∗ increases, however, the marginal benefit decreases. The cost of suppressing the
bad signal, on the other hand, is due to the fact that for some realizations of the cost
k, overconfidence will deter self-1 from exerting self-improvement effort, even though
this effort would be efficient. For low θ∗, the marginal cost will be relatively low, since
the cost realizations for which the switch away from self-improvement effort will occur
will be those for which the net expected benefit from exerting effort is relatively low.
As θ∗ increases, self-improvement effort is discouraged also for lower cost realizations;
i.e. the ones for which the net expected benefit from exerting effort is higher. Thus
the marginal cost increases as θ∗ increases.
In other words, given pi, the gain from suppressing the bad signal increases at
a decreasing rate with the level of trust by self-1, while the cost increases at an
increasing rate. For pi within the intermediate range (piH > pi > piL), therefore, there
will be a mixed-strategy equilibrium corresponding to the intermediate level of trust
by self-1 which leaves self-0 exactly indifferent between truthful transmission and
suppression of the bad signal. In addition, since more trusting beliefs by self-1 will
reduce the net gain from suppression, there will be a pure-strategy equilibrium with
truthful transmission. Similarly, since less trusting beliefs by self-1 will increase the
this Proposition, it may be worth noting that we cannot simply apply the proof of Proposition 2 in
their paper, and thus adopt a different proof method. The details of the difference in the proof are
in the Appendix.
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net gain from suppression, there will be a pure-strategy equilibrium with suppression
of the bad signal.
4.3.1 Overconfidence and underconfidence
The results summarized in Proposition 1 show that different equilibria are possible
depending on the value of pi, including pure strategy equilibria with accurate recall
or complete suppression of the bad signal, as well as mixed strategy equilibria. We
now consider the implications for confidence.
In a sufficiently large population, our assumptions mean that a fraction 1− q will
observe the bad signal, while the remainder will observe no signal.
In a pure strategy equilibrium with accurate recall, updated beliefs at t = 1 will
be θL for those who observed the bad signal, and θH for those who did not: there will
be no overconfidence and no underconfidence.
In a pure strategy equilibrium with suppression of the bad signal, updated beliefs
at t = 1 will be the same for all individuals, equal to θ ≡ qθH + (1 − q)θL. Clearly,
therefore, there will be both overconfidence and underconfidence in absolute terms.
This is because low-ability individuals essentially pool with high-ability individuals:
as a consequence, low-ability individuals will have overconfident beliefs, while high-
ability individuals will have under-confident beliefs. If we assume that low-ability
individuals represent in fact the majority in the population (i.e. q < 0.5), the median
ability is equal to θL, implying that most people will hold overconfident beliefs both
in absolute and in relative terms.
4.3.2 Implications and discussion
Our results suggest that overconfidence is more likely to prevail in very “dynamic”
societies (low value of pi) than in very “stable” societies (high value of pi). The US can
be thought of as a very dynamic society in the sense of this paper: takeovers play an
important role in corporate governance; employee turnover is relatively high; layoffs
are common during economic downturns; entrepreneurial activity is high. Politically,
two main parties alternate in government. Divorce rates are relatively high.
Japan, during much of the post-war period (the period that shaped the confidence
attitudes examined in the psychology studies discussed in section 2), has been a
relatively more stable society, with one main party in power during much of the
period, an emphasis on lifetime employment with the same firm, a very minor role for
takeovers in corporate governance, combined with a tendency to invest for the long
term, and to form stable industrial/financial groups.
Our results are therefore consistent with the finding of significantly greater over-
confidence in the U.S. than in Japan. They also suggest that confidence attitudes
in Japan may change in the future, to the extent that Japan becomes a much more
“dynamic” society in the sense of this paper (but see also section 5 on this).
Our main focus is on the US and Japan, two countries for which the distinction
between “high-pi” and “low-pi” societies appears to fit well. They are also the two
countries for which the most significant differences in self-esteem scores have been
documented in a number of studies. It is nevertheless interesting to look at self-esteem
scores for other countries too, presented by Schmitt and Allik (2005). Obviously many
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countries appear to be “low-pi” on some dimensions and “high-pi” on others: these
countries correspond to those in the intermediate range for pi in our model, suggesting
that multiple equilibria are possible. We might conjecture, though, that a country
like Switzerland will be closer to the “high-pi” type, and a country like Israel to the
“low-pi”. Interestingly, Schmitt and Allik (2005) report a relatively low mean self-
competence score24 for Switzerland (14.30) and a high one for Israel (17.50): these
can be compared to the reported mean scores for Japan (13.33) and the US (17.21).
While our model is too stylized to provide an adequate comprehensive explanation for
differences in self-esteem scores across countries, these findings suggest that it may
capture part of the explanation, and may usefully inform future empirical work.25
4.4 Extensions
The analysis developed in this section can be extended in a number of interesting
directions: we review and discuss some of them below.
4.4.1 Richer signal structure
While the main insights of the model emerge clearly in the simplest version with just
two signals (bad signal and no signal), it is worth considering what happens if we
also allow for a good signal. Formally, the model is modified as follows: s can take
one of three values, s = B (“bad” signal) with probability p, s = ∅ (no signal) with
probability q, and s = G (“good” signal) with probability 1 − q − p. Denote by θs
the expected value of θ conditional on each possible realization of the true signal s.
Naturally, we assume that θB < θ∅ < θG.26
If the true signal is s = ∅, again, there is no opportunity for signal manipulation;
thus sˆ = ∅. On the other hand, if the true signal is s = B (or G), self-0 may either
communicate the signal truthfully to self-1 (sˆ = B (or G)), or he may decide to
suppress the signal (sˆ = ∅). Let hj denote the recall strategy chosen by self-0 when
he receives the signal j ∈ {B,G}; that is, hj = Pr[sˆ = j|s = j].
For simplicity, we focus on pure strategy equilibria. The following result rules out
the possibility of an equilibrium in which the individual suppresses the bad signal and
the good signal:
24Self-competence scores best capture beliefs about ability, as discussed in section 2. The same
rankings emerge if we look instead at global self-esteem scores.
25It is tempting to consider possible cross-sectional implications of our analysis: do individuals
who expect, for exogenous reasons, to face more frequent new investment decisions tend to hold more
confident beliefs, ceteris paribus? We are not aware of any empirical study specifically addressing this
question. The evidence on CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008)) is suggestive,
but endogeneity is clearly an issue. Casual comparisons between different groups are fraught with
difficulties: for example, comparing confidence levels among children of married and divorced parents
would need to control for the degree of parental attention, caring and support, which can impact a
child’s self-esteem directly, generating a potential confound with the effect of divorce on expectations
of future stability.
26Similarly, we assume that δφ(θmax − θG)W > kL, δφ(θmax − θB)W < kH , δθBV − cL > 0, and
δθGV − cH < 0. Furthermore, we focus on the more interesting case where β < θB/θG, which rules
out the possibility of over-investment in new projects, and β < (θmax − θG) / (θmax − θB), which
rules out the possibility of over-investment in self-improvement, irrespective of the beliefs held by
self-1.
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Lemma 1 In any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it is impossible to have h∗B < 1 and
h∗G < 1.
We therefore have three pure strategy equilibria to consider: one with accurate
transmission of both signals, one with suppression of the bad signal, and one with
suppression of the good signal. The conditions for each of these three equilibria are
given below.
Proposition 2 There exist four threshold values, piOL < pi
O
H < pi
U
L < pi
U
H :
(i) if pi < piOL , there is a unique PBE with h
∗
B = 0 and h
∗
G = 1;
(ii) if piOL < pi < pi
O
H , there are two PBEs: (a) h
∗
B = 0 and h
∗
G = 1, (b) h
∗
B = 1 and
h∗G = 1;
(iii) if piOH < pi < pi
U
L , there is a unique PBE with h
∗
B = 1 and h
∗
G = 1;
(iv) if piUL < pi < pi
U
H , there are two PBEs: (a) h
∗
B = 0 and h
∗
G = 1, (b) h
∗
B = 0
and h∗G = 0;
(v) otherwise, there is a unique PBE with h∗B = 1 and h
∗
G = 0.
Intuitively, when the expected loss from under-investment in new projects is suf-
ficiently large, it is optimal to suppress the bad signal. On the other hand, when the
expected loss from under-provision of self-improvement effort is sufficiently large, it
is optimal to suppress the good signal. When the trade-off between these two effects
is more balanced, we can have an equilibrium with accurate transmission of both
signals.
Thus in very dynamic societies, the bad signal is suppressed in equilibrium, gen-
erating a distribution of ex-post beliefs that is skewed towards higher self-confidence
(relative to accurate beliefs): individuals who have received the good signal have
the highest (and accurate) level of self-confidence, but then those who received the
bad signal pool with those who received no signal, achieving a higher level of self-
confidence than if they had accurate beliefs. The skewness towards higher self-esteem
is consistent with the pattern documented for North Americans, as discussed in sec-
tion 2.
In relatively more stable societies, we can have the equilibrium with truthful
transmission of both signals. Ex post beliefs are then accurate, generating a more
symmetric distribution, consistent with the pattern documented for Japan. Finally for
societies where the probability of facing new project investment decisions is very low,
the equilibrium exhibits suppression of the good signal, generating a distribution of
ex-post beliefs skewed towards lower self-confidence. We conjecture that this pattern,
which does not resemble those observed for either Japan or the United States, may
require a degree of “stability” that is unlikely to be found in the presence of a highly
integrated global economy.
4.4.2 Naive agents
Our analysis so far has assumed that individuals are rational and cognitively so-
phisticated. They are therefore aware of their own incentives to engage in memory-
management and self-esteem maintenance strategies, and able to update their beliefs
accordingly. In reality, there may also be some naive individuals who suppress bad
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signals about their ability without being in any way aware that they are doing so,
and hence without taking this possibility into account in updating their beliefs ex
post. These unaware agents always have ex-post beliefs equal to θH . Their presence
can therefore generate some overconfidence, on average, even in a population where
other agents do not engage in self-esteem maintenance strategies.
A different way in which individuals may depart from the assumption of rationality
and cognitive sophistication is that they may lack the cognitive skills for full Bayesian
updating of beliefs ex post, even though they are aware of the potential scope for
memory management ex ante. These agents can behave strategically ex ante, taking
into account their cognitive constraints. To see the implications, consider again the
baseline version of our model, and suppose that self-1 lacks the cognitive skills for
Bayesian updating completely, so that his belief upon observing no signal (sˆ = ∅) is
simply θ∗ = θH . Knowing this, self-0 expects the net gain from suppressing the bad
signal to be equal to:
US(θL, θ
∗)− UT (θL) = −pi
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θH)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}gdk
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθH
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}fdc.
It is straightforward to check that there is then a threshold value piN such that
0 < piN < 1 and the net gain from suppressing the bad signal is strictly positive
(negative) for pi < (>)piN .
An immediate implication of this (together with Proposition 1) is that for suf-
ficiently low values of pi all agents, sophisticated and naive, will suppress the bad
signal. Ex post, naive agents will have higher self-confidence (θH) than sophisticated
agents (θ). This is true for naive agents of both types, i.e. those who are unaware
and those who are cognitively constrained. In contrast, when pi is sufficiently high,
only unaware agents will suppress the bad signal. These individuals will always have
beliefs equal to θH ex post. Cognitively-constrained but aware agents, on the other
hand, will have the same ex-post beliefs as sophisticated agents (i.e. accurate beliefs).
The average level of self-confidence in the population will therefore be higher, for a
given mixture of sophisticated, cognitively-constrained and unaware agents, in very
dynamic societies than in more stable ones. This may help to explain the higher
average level of self-esteem in the United States, relative to Japan.
4.4.3 Welfare implications
Consider again the baseline version of the model. We have seen that, conditional
on observing the “bad” signal concerning their ability, individuals may optimally
suppress the signal in some circumstances (depending on the value of pi). This leads
them to have higher beliefs about their ability than in an equilibrium with accurate
recall. On the other hand, in an equilibrium with signal suppression, sophisticated
individuals who observe no bad signal will have underconfident beliefs ex post, since
they rationally take into account the possibility that they may have suppressed a bad
signal.
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In assessing the welfare implications of memory-management and creative inter-
pretation strategies, we take an ex ante perspective27: if an individual could choose
whether to engage in such strategies or refrain from doing so before learning his true
ability (more precisely, before observing the true signal s), what would he do?
It turns out that ex ante it would be optimal to commit not to engage in memory-
management and creative interpretation strategies: the expected cost of such strate-
gies outweighs the expected gain. The intuition for this result is the following. As we
have seen, in an equilibrium with suppression of the bad signal, low-ability individuals
will have overconfident beliefs and high-ability individuals will have underconfident
beliefs (in absolute terms). This means that low-ability individuals will be discouraged
from investing in self-improvement, while high-ability individuals will be encouraged
to invest in self-improvement. Yet it is the low-ability individuals who would benefit
most from investment in self-improvement. Similarly, low-ability individuals will be
encouraged to invest in the new project, while high-ability individuals will be dis-
couraged: yet it is the high-ability individuals who will benefit most from investment
in the new project.
4.4.4 Endogenizing dynamism and stability
Our analysis so far has taken pi as a given characteristic of the economic and social
environment, reflecting existing institutions as well as other exogenous factors influ-
encing the degree of stability. We now extend the model to allow individuals in a
society to vote over institutions, and thereby choose pi. This enables us to examine
the interaction between belief formation and institutional choices underlying the de-
gree of dynamism or stability in the society. In practice, the degree of stability in
a country at any given time will reflect both, institutional choices and a variety of
other exogenous influences (e.g. shocks to technology and the natural environment,
wars, relevant changes in other countries, etc.). Thus we see the analysis presented
earlier and the one developed below as complementary perspectives.
To keep the model as simple as possible, the extension has four dates, t = 0, 1,
2, 3. At t = 0, each individual starts a project, and receives a signal informative
about his ability θ. He chooses his recall strategy. At t = 1 each individual updates
his beliefs. He then votes on institutions that determine pi. For simplicity, pi may be
high, piH , or low, piL. At t = 2, each individual learns whether the current project is
continuing or ending. He then chooses his effort on the continuing project, or if the
project has ended, he decides whether to invest in a new project. All outcomes are
realized at t = 3.
The novel part occurs at t = 1, when individuals update their beliefs and decide
how to vote. We assume they vote sincerely for the policy (value of pi) that maximizes
their expected payoff at t = 1, given their updated beliefs. Note that if individuals
choose accurate recall at t = 0, a fraction q will have updated beliefs θH at t = 1,
and a fraction 1− q will have updated beliefs θL. They may vote differently. On the
other hand, if individuals choose to suppress bad signals at t = 0, they will all have
the same updated beliefs at t = 1, and vote in the same way.
27In taking the ex ante perspective we follow much of the literature on hyperbolic discounting.
Note however that there is no universal agreement on how to analyze welfare implications when the
different selves have conflicting preferences (see Bernheim and Rangel (2009)).
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Multiple equilibria with endogenous pi Our main interest here is to investigate
the possibility of multiple equilibria with endogenous pi. In particular, we explore
conditions for two pure strategy equilibria to arise: one in which individuals suppress
the bad signal at t = 0, and then vote for piL, and one in which they choose accurate
recall at t = 0, and then vote (at least, a majority of them) for piH .
At t = 1, each individual observes (recalls) either sˆ = B or sˆ = ∅. We know from
our earlier analysis that updated beliefs will be θL if sˆ = B, and θ
∗ if sˆ = ∅, where
θ∗ = r∗θH + (1− r∗)θL.
The individual’s expected payoff when sˆ = B is W1(B) ≡ UT (θL), given by
UT (θL) = E(pi)
(
δθLW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
kL
(δφ(θmax − θL)W − k) gdk
)
+ (1− E(pi))
∫ βδθLV
cL
(δθLV − c) fdc
where E(pi) denotes the expected value of pi.
The individual’s expected payoff when sˆ = ∅ is W1(∅) ≡ r∗US(θH)+(1−r∗)US(θL),
where
US(θi) = E(pi)
(
δθiW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
kL
(δφ(θmax − θi)W − k) gdk
)
+ (1− E(pi))
∫ βδθ∗V
cL
(δθiV − c) fdc.
It follows that the individual’s expected payoff when sˆ = B increases (decreases)
with E(pi) whenever A > (<)B, where:
A ≡ δθLW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
kL
(δφ(θmax − θL)W − k) gdk
B ≡
∫ βδθLV
cL
(δθLV − c) fdc
Similarly, the individual’s expected payoff when sˆ = ∅ increases (decreases) with
E(pi) whenever X > (<)Y , where:
X ≡ δθ∗W +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
kL
(δφ(θmax − θ∗)W − k) gdk
Y ≡
∫ βδθ∗V
cL
(δθ∗V − c) fdc
Clearly for W sufficiently large relative to V , everyone will vote for piH , irrespective
of their updated beliefs on θ. Similarly for V sufficiently large relative to W , everyone
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will vote for piL. The more interesting case for our purposes is where W and V are
such that voting behavior does depend on updated beliefs. In particular, we see28 that
for some parameter values we can have A > B, implying that a low-ability individual
who accurately recalls the bad signal prefers piH , while X < Y , implying that a low-
ability individual who suppresses the bad signal will prefer piL. Thus if low-ability
individuals are the majority, it is possible to have two equilibria, one where individuals
suppress bad signals and then vote for piL (overconfidence and dynamism), and one
where individuals choose accurate recall and then vote for piH (no overconfidence and
stability). In particular, these two pure strategy equilibria can emerge when A > B
and X ′ < Y ′, where X ′ and Y ′are the values of X and Y above evaluated at θ∗ = θ;
i.e.,
X ′ ≡ δθW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ)W
kL
(
δφ(θmax − θ)W − k) gdk,
Y ′ ≡
∫ βδθV
cL
(
δθV − c) fdc.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. A more confident individual is
more likely to invest in a new project if the old one comes to an end, and less likely to
under-invest because of hyperbolic discounting. His expected payoff is higher when
faced with a new investment decision; ex ante, this increases the expected benefit
from a more dynamic environment. Thus Y increases with θ∗. On the other hand,
a more confident individual is less likely to exert self-improvement effort if the old
project is continued, which exacerbates the under-provision of effort in the presence
of hyperbolic discounting. This effect tends to reduce X as θ∗ increases. At the same
time, in the absence of self-improvement effort, a more confident individual will have
higher expectations of success if the old project is continued: this effect tends to
increase X as θ∗ increases. When this last effect is relatively weak compared to the
first two, X − Y will decrease with θ∗, yielding the possibility of multiple equilibria
just discussed.
5 Shame
Our analysis so far has focused on how cultural differences in (over)confidence may
emerge in equilibrium when individuals can engage in “creative” interpretation and
selective attention strategies to manage their self-esteem. We now extend the analysis
to study the role of “social” emotions, in particular shame, and how this interacts
with confidence.
Our approach builds on two observations, motivated by the evidence discussed in
section 2: (i) the vast majority of people (in all societies) are endowed with a capacity
28To see this, note that X − Y is strictly decreasing in θ∗ when the following condition holds:
βδ(2− β)[φ2gW 2 (θmax − θ∗) + V 2θ∗f ] > W (1 + φgkL) + V fcL.
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to feel the emotion of shame29; however, (ii) individuals’ sensitivity to shame may be
enhanced, or reduced, as a consequence of their upbringing and experience of social
interactions.
In the model, we now suppose that society can impose a cost of shame S on
individuals who adopt certain behaviors. The magnitude of this cost depends on
society for two reasons: first, as just noted, because individuals’ sensitivity to feelings
of shame can be fostered, or reduced, by the social environment in which they grow up
(family, school, neighborhood, media, etc.). Second, because society determines not
only what constitutes “shameful” behavior, but also a variety of sanctions correlated
with the degree of “shamefulness”, ranging from mild disapproval to social stigma,
ostracism and different kinds of prohibitions and punishments.
We assume that the cost of shame can only be imposed for publicly observable
behaviors. This is obviously the case for “public shame”, where the cost is linked to
losing face and being the target of others’ disapproval. However, the psychology liter-
ature on shame suggests that the assumption is also reasonable for “private shame”,
since this essentially internalizes others’ critical gaze on the self30.
In our model, we assume that self-improvement effort is only privately known,
while an individual’s investment in the new project is observable by others. For ex-
ample, it may be fairly easy for others to observe whether their friend or acquaintance
has found a new job, moved to a different location, embarked on a new degree or train-
ing course, started a new business, learned a new skill, started a new relationship, etc.
It may be considerably harder for them to observe how much effort he is exerting to
come up with better ways of doing his existing job, or how hard he is trying to make
an existing relationship work well. To capture this distinction as simply as possible,
we assume that the cost S is incurred by individuals who, when the first project ends,
do not invest in the new project31. Moreover, S cannot depend on the individual’s
realization of c, since the personal cost of the investment (material and psychological)
is only known to the individual.
The optimal social choice of S in our setting can be studied as a representative
individual’s ex-ante choice, “behind the veil of ignorance” (i.e. before he observes his
private signal s). Since the magnitude of S will depend a great deal on upbringing
and on childhood social interactions (see the evidence reviewed in section 2), one way
to think about this in practice is in terms of inter-generational cultural transmission.
Thus the older generation (parents) chooses S for the younger generation (children),
before learning the realizations of the individual children’s ability signals. This seems
a reasonable interpretation in light of the evidence that sensitivity to shame is influ-
enced by parenting practices and socialization at an early age (e.g. Miller, Fung and
29Fessler (2007) provides an evolutionary account of the development of this emotion, arguing
that it evolved from an ancestral form functioning as a mechanism for appeasement in dominance
relationships, to a specifically human form functioning to enhance conformity to cultural standards
for behavior.
30Thus even when an audience is not present, the self may react to the evaluation of an imagined
audience (“what would they think if they could see this?”). This still requires the behavior to be
potentially observable by the imagined audience, and is therefore more applicable to observable
actions than to internal states of mind like “effort”.
31We can think of these as individuals who persistently do not produce any visible signs of new
investments, such as the ones just discussed.
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Mintz (1996).
Before studying the optimal choice of S, we need to characterize equilibrium
behavior in the presence of an exogenously given cost of shame. This is done below.
5.1 Self-1 behavior
Turning first to self-1’s behavior, it is immediate that, since self-improvement effort
is not observable, self-1 will exert self-improvement effort if, and only if,
βδφ(θmax − θ∗)W > k
However, if the first project has ended, self-1 will undertake the new project if,
and only if,
βδθ∗V − c > −S.
5.2 Self-0 strategy
How is self-0’s strategy affected by the existence of a cost of shame S, associated with
not undertaking the new project? Will this make it easier to alleviate the project
under-investment problem ex post, and truthful transmission of the bad signal more
attractive ex ante?
Suppose that self-0 observes s = B. If he transmits the signal accurately to self-1
(sˆ = B), his expected utility is given by:
UST (θL) = pi[δθLW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θL)]W − k}gdk]
+ (1− pi)[
∫ min{βδθLV+S, cH}
cL
{δθLV − c}fdc−
∫ cH
min{βδθLV+S, cH}
Sfdc].
If on the other hand self-0 suppresses the bad signal (sˆ = ∅), his expected utility
depends on self-1’s beliefs about the reliability of the signal, r∗, and is given by:
USS (θL, θ(r
∗)) = pi[δθLW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θL)]W − k}gdk]
+ (1− pi)[
∫ min{βδθ∗V+S, cH}
cL
{δθLV − c}fdc−
∫ cH
min{βδθ∗V+S, cH}
Sfdc].
The net gain from suppressing the bad signal is therefore equal to:
USS (θL, θ(r
∗))− UST (θL)
= −pi[
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}gdk]
+ (1− pi)[
∫ min{βδθ∗V+S, cH}
min{βδθLV+S, cH}
{δθLV − c}fdc+ fS
∫ min{βδθ∗V+S, cH}
min{βδθLV+S, cH}
dc].
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Consider first the case where S 6 cH − βδθ∗V . In this case it is straightforward
to verify that the value of the expression does not, in fact, depend on S, and is equal
to the value of the corresponding expression without shame, US(θL, θ(r
∗))− UT (θL),
given by equation (1). We therefore have the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose society imposes a fixed cost of shame S 6 cH − βδθ∗V on
individuals who, when faced with the choice to invest or not invest in the new project,
decide not to invest. Then irrespective of the magnitude of S, the set of Perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the signaling game between self-0 and self-1 will be the same as
in the absence of shame, and is described by Proposition 1.
Now consider the case where S > cH − βδθ∗V . Clearly if S ≥ cH − βδθLV ,
self-1 will always invest in the new project (and thereby avoid incurring any cost of
shame), irrespective of the realization of c and of the signal transmitted by self-0.
Thus without loss of generality we can focus attention on S 6 cH − βδθLV . When
this condition holds as an equality (implying that self-1, as just noted, will always
invest in the new project), the net gain from suppressing the bad signal is always
strictly negative. There is therefore a unique equilibrium with truthful transmission.
In the range cH − βδθ∗V < S < cH − βδθLV , on the other hand, the set of Perfect
Bayesian equilibria is characterized by the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose society imposes a fixed cost of shame S on individuals who,
when faced with the choice to invest or not invest in the new project, decide not
to invest, and this cost satisfies the condition cH − βδθ∗V < S < cH − βδθLV .
Then irrespective of the magnitude of S, the set of Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
signaling game between self-0 and self-1 will be as follows. There exist two threshold
values, piSH and pi
S
L (with pi
S
H > pi
S
L), such that: (i) if pi > pi
S
H , there is a unique PBE
with h∗ = 1; (ii) if pi < piSL, there is a unique PBE with h
∗ = 0; (iii) otherwise,
there are three PBEs: the two pure-strategy equilibria with h∗ = 1 and h∗ = 0 , and a
mixed-strategy equilibrium.
5.3 How much shame?
Is it ever desirable to have a strictly positive cost of shame S? How much shame, if
any, is socially optimal? Our model can help to shed light on these questions. In this
section, we focus on the two most interesting cases, in terms of comparing very stable
(in the sense of having a high value of pi) and very dynamic (low value of pi) societies.
5.3.1 Very stable societies
We first consider very stable societies, where pi > max(piH , pi
S
H). We know from the
results so far that in these societies there is a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of the signaling game between self-0 and self-1, whereby self-0 always transmits his
observed signal truthfully.
To study the socially optimal choice of S, we consider a representative individual’s
choice at date 0 before learning the true value of his signal s. As discussed earlier,
we can think of this in terms of intergenerational cultural transmission, with the
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older generation choosing S for the younger generation before learning the individual
realizations of each personal signal s. The choice of S then corresponds to a choice
of child-rearing, education and socialization practices, as suggested by the evidence
reviewed in section 2.
At date 0, the representative individual expects to observe the “bad” signal, s = B,
with probability 1− q, and no signal, s = ∅, with probability q. His expected utility
is therefore equal to W ST ≡ qUST (θH) + (1− q)UST (θL), where
UST (θi) = pi[δθiW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θi)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θi)W − k}gdk]
+ (1− pi)[
∫ βδθiV+S
cL
{δθiV − c}fdc−
∫ cH
βδθiV+S
Sfdc]
for i = H,L. Differentiating by S yields
∂UST (θi)
∂S
= (1− pi)f [δθiV − cH + S].
Remembering that θ = qθH + (1− q)θL, we have
∂W ST
∂S
= (1− pi)f [δθV − cH + S); ∂
2(W ST )
∂S2
= (1− pi)f > 0
which implies that there is no interior solution for S. Thus without loss of generality
we can focus attention on two possibilities: S = 0 and S = cH − βδθLV . It can be
easily verified that W ST may be written as the sum of a term which depends on S and
a term which does not depend on S, W ST ≡ W0 +W (S), with
W (S) ≡ q(1− pi)f(δθHV S − ScH + 1
2
S2) + (1− q)(1− pi)f(δθLV S − ScH + 1
2
S2)
= (1− pi)f(δθV S − ScH + 1
2
S2).
We therefore need to compare W (0) and W (cH − βδθLV ). Clearly W (0) = 0.
This yields the following result.
Proposition 5 In very stable societies, where pi > max(piH , pi
S
H), it will be socially
optimal to impose a strictly positive cost of shame S = cH − βδθLV if, and only if,
the following condition holds: δV (2θ − βθL) > cH .
The result shows that if time-inconsistency is sufficiently important (β is suffi-
ciently small), the cost of investing in the new project is not too high for any in-
dividual (cH is not too high), and the proportion of high-ability individuals in the
population (q) is sufficiently high, the cost of shame is optimally chosen so that in
equilibrium everyone undertakes the new project when the old one has ended. More-
over, in equilibrium nobody incurs the cost of shame. However, individuals with a
high personal cost c of undertaking the new project will bear a cost in excess of the
expected benefit: there will be over-investment.
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Thus it can be optimal for shame to play an important role in very stable societies,
where it can alleviate the problem of under-investment in new projects. However,
since the cost of shame cannot be individually tailored to the (privately known)
personal cost of investment, an over-investment problem will arise. When this is
less costly than the potential under-investment in the absence of shame, there is an
efficiency role for shame.
5.3.2 Very dynamic societies
We now turn to very dynamic societies, where pi < min(piL, pi
S
L). We know from
the results obtained earlier that in these societies there is a unique Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the signaling game between self-0 and self-1, whereby self-0 always
suppresses the bad signal, unless the cost of shame is set so high that everyone invests
in the new project when the old project has ended (S = cH − βδθLV ), irrespective of
the signal received by self-0 and the realization of the personal investment cost c. In
the latter case, the unique PBE entails truthful transmission of the signal by self-0.
Once again, we study a representative individual’s choice at date 0 before learning
the true value of his signal s. At this stage, the individual expects to observe the
“bad” signal, s = B, with probability 1 − q, and no signal, s = ∅, with probability
q. To begin with, consider the case where S = cH − βδθLV . Expected utility is then
equal to W ST , evaluated at S = cH − βδθLV . Denote the value of expected utility
in this case by W ST (cH − βδθLV ). Now consider the case where S < cH − βδθLV .
Expected utility is equal to W SS ≡ qUSS (θH) + (1− q)USS (θL), where
USS (θi) = pi[δθiW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θi)W − k}gdk]
+ (1− pi)[
∫ βδθV+S
cL
{δθiV − c}fdc−
∫ cH
βδθV+S
Sfdc]
for i = H,L. Differentiating by S yields
∂USS (θi)
∂S
= (1− pi)f [δθiV − cH + S]
and hence
∂W SS
∂S
= (1− pi)f [δθV − cH + S); ∂
2(W SS )
∂S2
= (1− pi)f > 0
just as in the case of very stable societies examined earlier, implying that there is
no interior solution for S. Thus here too, without loss of generality, we can focus
attention on two possibilities: S = 0 and S = cH − βδθV . The second of these two
corresponds to the case where the desire to avoid incurring the cost of shame is strong
enough to motivate everybody to invest in the new project if the old project ends.
But we know that setting S = cH − βδθLV achieves the same outcome, and induces
truthful transmission in equilibrium, which is optimal from an ex ante perspective
(see welfare analysis in the previous section).
We can therefore obtain the following result.
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Proposition 6 In very dynamic societies, where pi < min(piL, pi
S
L), it will be socially
optimal to impose a strictly positive cost of shame S = cH − βδθLV if, and only if,
the following condition holds: piA + 1
2
(1 − pi)f(cH − βδθV )[B − C] > 0 (C1),
where A ≡ gδφW 2(1 − 1
2
β2δφ)q(1 − q)(θH − θL)2 > 0, B ≡ δθV − βδθV > 0, and
C ≡ cH − δθV > 0. Thus we have two possible equilibria:
(i) An equilibrium with overconfidence (suppression of bad signal) and no cost of
shame (S = 0), when C1 does not hold
(ii) An equilibrium without overconfidence (truthful transmission) and a high cost
of shame (S = cH − βδθLV ), when C1 does hold.
Condition C1 has an intuitive interpretation: A represents the expected gain
from reliance on shame when the status quo project is continued in the long term.
Since the equilibrium with shame entails no overconfidence, while the one without
shame entails overconfidence, clearly reliance on shame provides better incentives to
exert self-improvement effort: this is captured by A. However, this gain occurs with
relatively low probability in very dynamic societies. With relatively high probability,
the individual will need instead to decide whether to invest in a new project. The
term B −C captures the net gain from reliance on shame in this case. The presence
of a high cost of shame makes it possible to“correct” more efficiently the under-
investment incentives associated with time-inconsistent preferences than would be
possible through memory management: this effect is captured by B. There is a price
for this though: when the cost of shame is high, individuals whose investment cost is
higher than the expected benefit will nevertheless invest, to avoid shame. This loss
is captured by C.
Clearly if B > C, condition C1 will be satisfied for all values of pi in the relevant
range (pi < min(piL, pi
S
L)), and irrespective of the magnitude of A. However, it is
straightforward to verify that B > C is a stronger condition than the necessary
and sufficient condition for shame to be optimal in very stable societies, given in
Proposition 5. If B < C, shame may not be efficient in very dynamic societies.
In particular, shame is less likely to be efficient as pi decreases, and as A decreases
relative to C −B.
5.3.3 Implications and discussion
Our analysis in this section has shown that reliance on shame as a motivational
device can be efficient in stable and in dynamic societies, depending on parameter
values. In stable societies, two types of equilibria can emerge: neither of the two
will entail overconfidence, while one of them will entail an important role for shame.
In dynamic societies there are also two types of equilibria: one with overconfidence
and no motivational role for shame, and the other with no overconfidence and an
important role for shame.
This is consistent with the evidence reviewed in section 2. Moreover, it suggests
that even if “stable” societies become more “dynamic”, in the sense of this paper,
this may not lead to cultural convergence in terms of the relative importance of social
emotions like shame, and self-esteem maintenance or self-enhancement. The exam-
ple of the “Four Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan)
is interesting in this respect: their mean self-competence scores are relatively low
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(Schmitt and Allik (2005))32, and we saw in section 2 that shame plays an important
role in Taiwan.
Our discussion has focused on the socially optimal choice of S, the cost of shame.
However, as mentioned earlier, our results can be interpreted in terms of intergenera-
tional cultural transmission: parents choosing S for their children before learning the
individual realizations of the children’s ability signals would make the same choice.
This interpretation fits well with the evidence on how parenting practices and social-
ization at an early age emphasize sensitivity to shame, or alternatively the importance
of self-confidence, as discussed in section 2.
6 Conclusion
Comparisons across cultures provide a very valuable opportunity for understanding
how economics and psychology interact. In this paper, we have focused on self-esteem
and shame, both of which have received considerable attention in the psychology
literature but far less attention in the economics literature. The available evidence
from numerous studies by psychologists suggests that overconfidence is a much more
important phenomenon in North America than in Japan. Relatedly, North Americans
appear to view high self-esteem much more positively than Japanese. The pattern is
reversed when it comes to shame, which appears to play a much more important role
among Japanese than North Americans.
We have developed an economic model that can rationalize these observed dif-
ferences. The model studies a potential tradeoff between the benefits of encouraging
self-improvement and the benefits of promoting initiative and new investments. In this
context, self-esteem maintenance (self-enhancement) and sensitivity to shame emerge
as (substitute) mechanisms to induce efficient effort and investment decisions. While
exploring their instrumental value, we also identify some important costs associated
with the use of each mechanism in equilibrium: reliance on self-esteem maintenance
strategies means that in equilibrium the incentives to invest in self-improvement will
be reduced for the individuals who could benefit most from such investment, and
similarly for investment in new projects. On the other hand, reliance on shame as an
incentive mechanism means that in equilibrium there will be over-investment.
The analysis presented here suggests a number of promising directions for future
research: for example, the model can be readily extended to study the role of manage-
ment practices such as kaizen (continuous improvement), and the potential tradeoff
with innovation. Perhaps most importantly to our minds, our work represents a first
step towards integrating the role of social emotions, time-inconsistent preferences and
self-serving biases into economic models able to shed light on observed economic and
psychological differences across cultures.
32Schmitt and Allik present self-competence scores for three of the “Four Asian Tigers”; the
missing one is Singapore.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Define
X (r∗, pi)
≡ US(θL, θ(r∗))− UT (θL)
= −piX1 + (1− pi)X2
where X1 ≡
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W {δφ(θmax−θL)W −k}dG(k) > 0 and X2 ≡
∫ βδθ∗V
βδθLV
{δθLV −
c}dF (c) > 0.
It is clear that X (r∗, pi) is continuous and decreasing in pi for all r∗ ∈ [q, 1] as X1
and X2 are both positive. Further, we have that X (r
∗, 1) < 0 and X (r∗, 0) > 0 for
all r∗. Thus there is a unique pi∗ (r∗) such that X (r∗, pi∗ (r∗)) = 0, and X (r∗, pi) > 0
for all pi < pi∗ (r∗) , and X (r∗, pi) < 0 for all pi > pi∗ (r∗) for all r∗.
By the implicit function theorem, we have that
dpi∗
dθ∗
= −
dX(r∗,pi)
dθ∗
dX(r∗,pi)
dpi
=
(1− pi)βδV 2 (δθL − βδθ∗) f − piβδφW 2[δφ(θmax − θL)− βδφ(θmax − θ∗)]g∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W {δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k) +
∫ βδθ∗V
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
where the denominator is always positive. Notice that the sign of the numerator is
ambiguous. Thus, our proof here is not a straightforward extension of the proof of
Proposition 2 in Be´nabou and Tirole (2002).
There are three cases to consider.
(I) For pi sufficiently small, the numerator is positive. Since the numerator is
decreasing in θ∗, formally, we have dpi
∗
dθ∗ > 0 for
pi < pi1 ≡ V
2 (θL − βθH) f
V 2 (θL − βθH) f + φ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθH)]g .
For values of pi satisfying this condition, pi∗ (r∗) is increasing in r∗, since θ∗ is
increasing in r∗.
Notice that it is straightforward to verify that pi∗ (q) > pi∗ (1) > pi1.
To show it, since
X (q, pi∗ (q))
= −pi∗ (q)
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k) + (1− pi∗ (q))
∫ βδθV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
= 0
where θ ≡ qθH + (1− q)θL, we have
pi∗ (q) =
∫ βδθV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ)W {δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k) +
∫ βδθV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
.
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Similarly, we have
pi∗ (1) =
∫ βδθHV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θH)W {δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k) +
∫ βδθHV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
.
The sign of pi∗ (q)− pi∗ (1) equals the sign of∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θH)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k)
∫ βδθV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
−
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k)
∫ βδθHV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
=
(1− β) (θH − θL)
(
θ − θL
) (
θH − θ
)
θmaxgfβ3δ4φ2W 2V 2
2
,
which is positive.
Further,
pi∗ (1)− pi1
=
∫ βδθHV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θH)W {δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k) +
∫ βδθHV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
− V
2 (θL − βθH) f
V 2 (θL − βθH) f + φ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθH)]g
=
A
A+B
− V
2 (θL − βθH) f
V 2 (θL − βθH) f + φ2W 2 [(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθH)] g
where
A = (θL − βθH + (1− β)θL) (θH − θL)V 2f
and
B = ((1− β)(2θmax − θL)− (θL − βθH)) (θH − θL)φ2W 2g.
It further equals
Aφ2W 2 [(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθH)] g −BV 2 (θL − βθH) f
(A+B) (V 2 (θL − βθH) f + φ2W 2 [(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθH)] g)
The denominator is positive. The numerator equals
φ2βθmaxfgV 2W 2 (θH − θL)2 (1− β)
which is also positive.
Thus we must have X (r∗, pi) > 0 for all r∗. Therefore, there is a unique PBE with
h∗ = 0.
(II) The numerator is negative for pi sufficiently large. Since the numerator is
decreasing in θ∗, formally, we have dpi
∗
dθ∗ < 0 for
pi > pi2 ≡
V 2
(
θL − βθ
)
f
V 2
(
θL − βθ
)
f + φ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθ)]g
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where pi2 > pi1.
For values of pi satisfying this condition, pi∗ (r∗) is decreasing in r∗, since θ∗ is
increasing in r∗. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that pi∗ (q) > pi2.
To see it,
pi∗ (q)− pi2
=
∫ βδθV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ)W {δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}dG(k) +
∫ βδθV
βδθLV
{δθLV − c}dF (c)
− V
2
(
θL − βθ
)
f
V 2
(
θL − βθ
)
f + φ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθ)]g
=
C
C +D
− V
2
(
θL − βθ
)
f
V 2
(
θL − βθ
)
f + φ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθ)]g
where
C =
(
θL − βθ + (1− β)θL
) (
θ − θL
)
V 2f
and
D =
(
(1− β)(2θmax − θL)− (θL − βθ)
) (
θ − θL
)
φ2W 2g.
It further equals
Cφ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθ)]g −DV 2
(
θL − βθ
)
f
(C +D)
(
V 2
(
θL − βθ
)
f + φ2W 2[(1− β)θmax − (θL − βθ)]g
)
The denominator is positive. The numerator equals
φ2βθmaxfgV 2W 2
(
θ − θL
)2
(1− β)
which is also positive.
We therefore have the following results when pi > pi2.
(i) If pi > pi∗ (q) , X (r∗, pi) < 0 for all r∗. Therefore, there is a unique PBE with
h∗ = 1.
(ii) If pi < pi∗ (1) , we have that X (r∗, pi) > 0 for all r∗. Therefore, there is a unique
PBE with h∗ = 0.
(iii) If pi∗ (1) < pi < pi∗ (q) , since pi∗ (r∗) is a decreasing function, the inverse
function r∗ (pi) is also decreasing. Thus X (r∗, pi) has the same sign of r∗ (pi) − r∗,
implying that there are three PBEs: (a) r∗ = 1 (h∗ = 1) with r∗ > r∗ (pi) , (b) r∗ = q
(h∗ = 0) with r∗ < r∗ (pi) , and (c) a mixed one with h∗ such that X (r∗ (pi) , pi) = 0.
(III) For intermediate values of pi ∈ [pi1, pi2] , there is a threshold value θ(pi) such
that when θ∗ < θ(pi), dpi
∗
dθ∗ > 0,and when θ
∗ > θ(pi), dpi
∗
dθ∗ < 0. Thus pi
∗ (r∗) increases in
r∗ as long as r∗ is smaller than some cutoff value r and decreases thereafter.
We therefore have the following results when pi ∈ [pi1, pi2].
(i) If pi < pi∗ (1) , we have that X (r∗, pi) > 0 for all r∗. Therefore, there is a unique
PBE with h∗ = 0.
(ii) If pi∗ (1) < pi < pi∗ (q) , there are three PBEs: (a) r∗ = 1 (h∗ = 1) , (b) r∗ = q
(h∗ = 0) , and (c) a mixed one with h∗ such that X (r∗, pi) = 0.
To complete the proof, let piH ≡ pi∗ (q), and piL ≡ pi∗ (1).
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7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. When sˆ = B, or G, clearly there has been no suppression so that the revised
belief is θ∗(B) = θB and θ∗(G) = θG. When sˆ = ∅, self-1’s estimate of its reliability is
given by:
r∗(∅) = Pr[s = ∅|sˆ = ∅;h∗B;h∗G] =
q
p(1− h∗B) + q + (1− q − p) (1− h∗G)
,
and self-1’s belief that this is actually a bad signal is given by:
b∗(∅) = Pr[s = B|sˆ = ∅;h∗B;h∗G] =
p(1− h∗B)
p(1− h∗B) + q + (1− q − p) (1− h∗G)
.
It implies that his revised belief of his ability conditional on no signal ∅ is given by:
θ∗(∅) = r∗(∅)θ∅ + b∗(∅)θB + (1− r∗(∅)− b∗(∅)) θG
which is strictly greater than θB and strictly less than θG.
When s = B, self-0 has to choose the recall strategy, hB. If he transmits the
signal accurately to self-1 (sˆ = B), his expected utility is given by:
UT (θB) = pi
[
δθBW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θB)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θB)W − k}gdk
]
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθBV
cL
{δθBV − c}fdc.
If on the other hand self-0 suppresses the bad signal (sˆ = ∅), his expected utility is
given by:
US(θB, θ
∗) = pi
[
δθBW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θB)W − k}gdk
]
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθ∗V
cL
{δθBV − c}fdc.
The net gain from suppressing the bad signal is therefore equal to:
US(θB, θ
∗)− UT (θB) = (1− pi)
∫ βδθ∗V
βδθBV
{δθBV − c}fdc
− pi
∫ βδφ(θmax−θB)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
{δφ(θmax − θB)W − k}gdk
=
βδ2 (θ∗ − θB)
2
[
(1− pi)fV 2X2 − piφ2gW 2X1
]
where
X2 = 2θB − βθB − βθ∗
and
X1 = 2θ
max − 2βθmax + βθ∗ + βθB − 2θB.
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Similarly, when s = G, self-0 has to choose the recall strategy, hG. If he transmits
the signal accurately to self-1 (sˆ = G), his expected utility is given by:
UT (θG) = pi
[
δθGW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θG)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θG)W − k}gdk
]
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθGV
cL
{δθGV − c}fdc.
If self-0 suppresses the bad signal (sˆ = ∅), his expected utility is given by:
US(θG, θ
∗) = pi
[
δθGW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θG)W − k}gdk
]
+ (1− pi)
∫ βδθ∗V
cL
{δθGV − c}fdc.
The net gain from suppressing the bad signal is therefore equal to:
US(θG, θ
∗)− UT (θG) = pi
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
βδφ(θmax−θG)W
{δφ(θmax − θG)W − k}gdk
− (1− pi)
∫ βδθGV
βδθ∗V
{δθGV − c}fdc
=
βδ2 (θG − θ∗)
2
[
piφ2gW 2Y1 − (1− pi)fV 2Y2
]
where
Y1 = 2θ
max − 2βθmax + βθ∗ + βθG − 2θG
and
Y2 = 2θG − βθG − βθ∗.
Here, we can show that X1 > Y1, and X2 < Y2 as 2 > β and 0 < θB < θG.
Suppose US(θB, θ
∗) − UT (θB) ≥ 0. Then (1 − pi)fV 2X2 ≥ piφ2gW 2X1 because
θ∗ > θB.
Given that X2 < Y2 and X1 > Y1, we have that (1− pi)fV 2Y2 > piφ2gW 2Y1.
Then US(θG, θ
∗)− UT (θG) < 0 because θG > θ∗.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, we check the existence condition for the PBE with h∗B = 0. By Lemma
1, we know that in this PBE we must have h∗G = 1.
Thus this PBE exists if US(θB, θ
∗)−UT (θB) ≥ 0 where θ∗ = (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q) ,
that is,
(1− pi)fV 2X2 (θB, θ∗)− piφ2gW 2X1 (θB, θ∗) ≥ 0
where
X2(θB, θ
∗)
= X2 (θB, (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q))
= 2θB − βθB − β (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q)
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and
X1 (θB, θ
∗)
= X1 (θB, (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q))
= 2θmax − 2βθmax + β (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q) + βθB − 2θB.
It is equivalent to
pi ≤ piOH
=
fV 2X2 (θB, (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q))
fV 2X2 (θB, (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q)) + φ2gW 2X1 (θB, (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q))
.
Second, we check the existence condition for the PBE with h∗G = 0. By Lemma 1, we
know that in this PBE we must have h∗B = 1.
Thus this PBE exists if US(θG, θ
∗)−UT (θG) ≥ 0 where θ∗ = ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p) ,
that is,
piφ2gW 2X1 (θG, θ
∗)− (1− pi)fV 2X2 (θG, θ∗) ≥ 0
where
X1 (θG, θ
∗)
= X1 (θG, ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p))
= 2θmax − 2βθmax + β ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p) + βθG − 2θG.
and
X2 (θG, θ
∗)
= X2 (θG, ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p))
= 2θG − βθG − β ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p) .
It is equivalent to
pi ≥ piUL
=
fV 2X2 (θG, ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p))
fV 2X2 (θG, ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p)) + φ2gW 2X1 (θG, ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p)) .
Third, we check the existence condition for the PBE with h∗G = 1 and h
∗
B = 1.
This PBE exists if US(θB, θ
∗) − UT (θB) ≤ 0 and US(θG, θ∗) − UT (θG) ≤ 0 where
θ∗ = θ∅.
US(θB, θ
∗)− UT (θB) ≤ 0
is equivalent to
(1− pi)fV 2X2 (θB, θ∗)− piφ2gW 2X1 (θB, θ∗) ≤ 0
where
X2(θB, θ
∗)
= X2 (θB, θ∅)
= 2θB − βθB − βθ∅
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and
X1 (θB, θ
∗)
= X1 (θB, θ∅)
= 2θmax − 2βθmax + βθ∅ + βθB − 2θB.
It is equivalent to
pi ≥ piOL
=
fV 2X2 (θB, θ∅)
fV 2X2 (θB, θ∅) + φ2gW 2X1 (θB, θ∅)
.
Since θ∅ > (pθB + qθ∅) / (p+ q) , X2 (θB, θ∗) is decreasing in θ∗, and X1 (θB, θ∗) is
increasing in θ∗, it is clear that piOL < pi
O
H .
Furthermore,
US(θG, θ
∗)− UT (θG) ≤ 0
is equivalent to
piφ2gW 2X1 (θG, θ
∗)− (1− pi)fV 2X2 (θG, θ∗) ≤ 0
where
X1 (θG, θ
∗)
= X1 (θG, θ∅)
= 2θmax − 2βθmax + βθ∅ + βθG − 2θG.
and
X2 (θG, θ
∗)
= X2 (θG, θ∅)
= 2θG − βθG − βθ∅.
It is equivalent to
pi ≤ piUH
=
fV 2X2 (θG, θ∅)
fV 2X2 (θG, θ∅) + φ2gW 2X1 (θG, θ∅)
.
Since θ∅ < ((1− p− q) θG + qθ∅) / (1− p) , X2 (θG, θ∗) is decreasing in θ∗, and
X1 (θG, θ
∗) is increasing in θ∗, it is clear that piUH > pi
U
L .
Since piOL < pi
O
H and pi
U
H > pi
U
L , by Lemma 1, we have only two cases to consider:
(1) piOH < pi
U
L ; (2) pi
U
H < pi
O
L .
Notably, since X1 (θ, θ
∗) is decreasing in θ, and X2 (θ, θ∗) is increasing in θ, we
have that piUH > pi
O
L . Thus we rule out case (2).
Therefore, we have piOL < pi
O
H < pi
U
L < pi
U
H , which proves the proposition.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In the case where S 6 cH − βδθ∗V, we have that
USS (θL, θ(r
∗))− UST (θL) = −pi[
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W
{δφ(θmax − θL)W − k}gdk]
+ (1− pi)[
∫ βδθ∗V+S
βδθLV+S
{δθLV − c}fdc+ fS
∫ βδθ∗V+S
βδθLV+S
dc]
where the first term is independent of S, and the second term equals
1
2
(1− pi) δ2βfV 2 (θL − θ∗) (βθ∗ − 2θL + βθL)
which is also independent of S.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In the range cH − βδθ∗V < S < cH − βδθLV , define
Y (r∗, pi, S)
≡ USS (θL, θ(r∗))− UST (θL)
= −piX1 + (1− pi)Y2
where X1 ≡
∫ βδφ(θmax−θL)W
βδφ(θmax−θ∗)W {δφ(θmax− θL)W − k}gdk > 0 and Y2 ≡
∫ cH
βδθLV+S
{δθLV −
c}fdc+ fS ∫ cH
βδθLV+S
dc > 0. We can therefore apply similar methods to those used in
the proof of Proposition 1. Once again, it is clear that Y (r∗, pi, S) is continuous and
decreasing in pi for all r∗ ∈ [q, 1] as X1 and Y2 are both positive. Further, we have that
Y (r∗, 1, S) < 0 and Y (r∗, 0, S) > 0 for all r∗. Thus there is a unique pi∗∗ (r∗) such that
Y (r∗, pi∗∗ (r∗) , S) = 0, and Y (r∗, pi, S) > 0 for all pi < pi∗∗ (r∗) , and Y (r∗, pi, S) < 0
for all pi > pi∗∗ (r∗) for all r∗.
Note also that Y2 does not depend on θ
∗. Thus we have, by the implicit function
theorem,
dpi∗∗
dθ∗
= −
dY (r∗,pi,S)
dθ∗
dY (r∗,pi,S)
dpi
=
−piβδφW 2[δφ(θmax − θL)− βδφ(θmax − θ∗)]g
X1 + Y2
< 0
implying that pi∗∗ (r∗) is decreasing in r∗, since θ∗ is increasing in r∗.
We therefore have the following results.
(i) If pi > pi∗∗ (q) , Y (r∗, pi, S) < 0 for all r∗. Therefore, there is a unique PBE with
h∗ = 1.
(ii) If pi < pi∗∗ (1) , we have that Y (r∗, pi, S) > 0 for all r∗. Therefore, there is a
unique PBE with h∗ = 0.
(iii) If pi∗∗ (1) < pi < pi∗∗ (q) , since pi∗∗ (r∗) is a decreasing function, the inverse
function r∗ (pi) is also decreasing. Thus Y (r∗, pi, S) has the same sign of r∗ (pi)− r∗,
implying that there are three PBEs: (a) r∗ = 1 (h∗ = 1) with r∗ > r∗ (pi) , (b) r∗ = q
(h∗ = 0) with r∗ < r∗ (pi) , and (c) a mixed one with h∗ such that Y (r∗ (pi) , pi, S) = 0.
To complete the proof, let piSH ≡ pi∗∗ (q), and piSL ≡ pi∗∗ (1).
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7.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Note that W ST (cH − βδθLV ) = qUST (θH) + (1− q)UST (θL) where
UST (θi) = pi[δθiW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θi)W
kL
{δφ(θmax − θi)W − k}dG(k)]
+ (1− pi)
∫ cH
cL
{δθiV − c}dF (c).
W SS (0) = qU
S
S (θH) + (1− q)USS (θL) where
USS (θi) = pi
(
δθiW +
∫ βδφ(θmax−θ)W
kL
(δφ (θmax − θi)W − k) gdk
)
+ (1− pi)
(∫ βδθV
cL
(δθiV − c) fdc
)
.
Thus, it is straightforward to get
W ST (cH − βδθLV )−W SS (0)
= pigδφW 2
(
1− 1
2
β2δφ
)
q(1− q)(θH − θL)2
+ (1− pi) f (cH − βδθV )(δθV − 1
2
(
cH + βδθV
))
.
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